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RECENT DECISIONS
Corporations-Power of Court of Equity to Set Aside the Incorpora-
tion of a Partnership on the Ground of Fraud. - In Prince v. Sonnesyn,
25 N.W.2d 468 (1947, Minn.) the court set aside the incorporation of
a partnership where it was found that the plaintiffs were induced
by fraudulent representations made by the defendent to agree to
convert their three way equal partnership into a corporation in which
defendant would own 52 per cent of the stock and each plaintiff only
24 per cent. The fraudulent representations were to the effect that
defendant was personally liable on certain debts owed to one of the
partnership's creditors and that said creditor had told him that unless
he controlled the stock the creditor would have to discontinue the
discount banking of the company. The relief prayed was that the
defendant be required to surrender for cancellation the shares he
had over his one-third interest and that those shares be reissued to
the plaintiffs share and share alike. In addition, the plaintiffs asked
for such other and further relief as is just and equitable in the prem-
ises. The court did not grant the specific relief asked, but, instead,
set aside everything pertaining to the agreement to incorporate, the
incorporation, and the distribution of the stock.
The corporation involved in the Minnesota case was a de jure cor-
poration. When the fact of the existence of a corporation de facto
is established, it is settled law that its existence de jure cannot be
collaterally attacked, that is, by any other than the state under whose
laws its formation was brought about, and only then in a direct pro-
ceeding. The cases are legion. As the setting aside of the charter
in the above case, did not come about by a direct proceeding brought
about by a writ of quo warranto, it would appear at first blush to
contradict the general rule. However the general rule is not applic-
able where the formation of a corporation was a device to defraud
another. Here equity power to set aside acts whose foundation lay
in fraud was exercised to set the formation of the corporation aside.
Courts of equity have frequently found cause to exercise their
broad powers where partners have breached the fiduciary relationship,
which the law imposes upon them, in the formation of a corporation.
In forming the corporation and transferring to it the assets of property
of a partnership or association, the transactions should be free from
fraud, either upon the other partners or members, upon the newly
created corporation, or upon creditors or others. If in conveying or
failing to convey the property and assets to the newly created cor-
poration, fraud is practiced upon it, no doubt it may resort to the
I Kardo Co. V. Adams (C.C.A.) 231 F. 950, 1916.
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courts for appropriate legal or equitable relief, and partners, asso-
ciates or others defrauded by sales or transfers to the corporation are
likewise entitled to their remedy in the courts.?
In a recent New York decision the court stated that a court of
equity may disregard the fiction of corporate entity in order to pre-
vent fraud, preserve the rights of creditors or otherwise prevent the
commission of a gross injustice. 3 An Idaho court held that whether
after a partnership was incorporated into two corporations in which
the partners retained the same respective interests, the partnership
relation continued so as to impose on the majority stockholder and
manager the duty of a fiduciary as to disclosures and entitle the
minority stockholder to rescind the sale of his stock to the majority
stockholder for failure of the latter to disclose the true value of the
stock was an issue of fact.4
Where the owners of a partnership business form a corporation
and transfer to it the partnership, the former partners being prac-
tically the only stockholders therein and the business being conducted
in practically the same way as during the partnership, the relation
of confidence which existed between them as partners is presumed
prima facie to continue.5 In a federal case it was held that the evi-
dence was not sufficient to warrant the rescission of a sale by one
partner to the other of his stock in the corporation on the ground that
the sale had been induced by false statements and representations of
the buyer, it being shown that the relations of personal friendship
and confidence which for many years existed between the parties
had been broken some time before the sale, making the complainant
desirous of terminating their business connection; and that in making
the sale he did not act in reliance on any statements or representa-
tions made by defendant, but on his own independent knowledge and
judgment, and received a price not greatly below the actual value
of his interest in the property at the time. In that case, though the
court did not grant complainant relief, the court stated that the
confidential relation existing between partners may be presumed to
have continued after they formed a corporation to- which the partner-
ship property was transferred, and in which they were practically
the only stockholders, and to have induced one in selling his stock
to the other, who was tie active manager in the business, to place
reliance on the latter's statements in respect to the condition and
value of the property to the same extent as though the partnership
had continued, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 8, Chpt. 47, Sec. 4008, 1931.3 Ditmars Homes v. Logerfo, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 414, 1947.4 Anderson v. Lloyd, Idaho, 139 P 2d 244, 1943.
5 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 8, Chpt. 47, Sec. 4018, 1931.
6 Sullivan v. Pierce, 125 Fed. 104, 1903.
19473
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Where a partnership has been incorporated the rights subsequently
accruing to the partners or joint adventures are not based on the
corporate relationship. If a corporation or a formal partnership is
a mere agency for convenience in carrying out a joint venture agree-
ment, and independent and innocent third parties, such as creditors
or stockholders, are not injured thereby, in determining the rights
of the parties, they will be placed in the position each occupied under
the original agreement.7 In a recent Kentucky case where the cor-
porate stock was to be divided equally between complainants and de-
fendants but the defendants attempted to appropriate all of the stock
to themselves and attempted to deprive complainants of all beneficial
interest in the corporations, the court held that the defendants were
liable for one-half of the amount of dividends paid to them with
interest from the date of payment and corporate books were required
to be corrected to show complainants' interest in unpaid dividends.8
Thus it is seen that courts of equity have frequently stepped
behind the "corporate veil" and adjusted the rights of former part-
ners where one had taken advantage of the other by fraudulent
means. In the case first cited, however, the court went a step further
and set aside everything pertaining to the agreement to incorporate,
the incorporation, and the distribution of the stock. "As a general
rule the right to rescind must be exercised in toto. The contract must
stand in all its provisions or fall altogether. Accordingly, a party
cannot repudiate a contract or compromise so far as its terms are
unfavorable to him and claim the benefit of the residue. A partial
recission, however, may be allowed where the contract is a divisible
one".9 A case appears also in the recent New Jersey Equity Reports
where the power of rescission of a charter was similarly exercised.
There a corporation had been formed by a deceased partner's widow
and the surviving partner thereby defrauding the infant daughter of
the deceased partner. The court decreed that the corporation be dis-
solved and the assets disposed of in a proper manner; the corporation
and the incorporators being liable to pay to the guardian of the infant
the proportionate share in equity to which she was entitled upon the
death of the deceased partner.'0
The rule to be applied in view of the recited facts is that, since
fraud renders voidable everything into which it enters, the court
will look through any form of instrument or proceeding in order
to prevent a party from profiting by his fraud; that the court will
7 Elsbach v. Mulligan, Cal., 136 P 2d 651, 1943.
8 Blue Grass Mining Co. v. Richardson, 127 F 2d 291, 1942, affirming Richardson
v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 65s, 1939.
9 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, I 444, 1938.
10 Kanzler v. Smith, 123 N.J. Eq Reports, 602, 1938.
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not take a step to save harmless the party who is guilty of fraud;
and that no right can arise out of a fraudulent act.-
It appears from the cases indicated above that a court of equity
will exercise its powers to protect a partner who has been defrauded
by another partner in the conversion of a partnership into a corpora-
tion and that the remedy decreed, depending upon the facts of the
particular case, may be either a division of dividends in the ratio
which would have been proper had the fraud not been perpetrated
or a rescission of the corporation in toto and a return to the original
partnership arrangement..
Another point to be noted is that the plaintiffs did not ask for
a rescission of the charter in conjunction with other relief prayed.
It was a result of the court's unsolicited determination of the proper
relief to be granted when there has been fraud in the incorporation
of a partnership. A court of equity will mould its relief so as to
determine the rights of all the parties, and it will not allow the
pleadings to prevent it from getting at the heart of the controversy
and seeing that a right result is reached. In equity the kinds and
forms of specific remedies are as unlimited as the powers of such
courts to shape relief awarded in accordance with the circumstances
of the particular case. 2
A court of equity has the power to adapt its decree to the exi-
gencies of each particular case so as to accomplish justice. It is
traditional and characteristic of equity that it possesses the flexibility
and expansiveness to invent new remedies or modify old ones to meet
the requirement of every case and to satisfy the needs of a progres-
sive social condition1 3
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"Magee v. Odden, 220 Minn 498, 502, 20 N.W. 2d 87, 89, 1945.
12 2 Dunnell, Dig. P 3138.
13 Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 245, 14 N.W. 2d 360, 366, 1944.
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